Early Greek Philosophy by John Burnet, with Burnet's notes
145. The Numbers Spatial 147. The Numbers and the Elements

From Chapter VII., The Pythagoreans

146. The Numbers as Magnitudes
This way of regarding the point, the line, and the surface is closely bound up with the practice of representing numbers by dots arranged in symmetrical patterns, which we have seen reason for attributing to the Pythagoreans (§ 47). Geometry had already made considerable advances, but the old view of quantity as a sum of units had not been revised, and so, the point was identified with 1 instead of with 0. That is the answer to Zeller's contention that to regard the Pythagorean numbers as spatial is to ignore the fact that the doctrine was originally arithmetical rather than geometrical. Our interpretation takes full account of that fact, and indeed makes the peculiarities of the whole system depend on it. Aristotle is very decided as to the Pythagorean points having magnitude. "They construct the whole world out of numbers," he tells us, "but they suppose the units have magnitude. As to how the first unit with magnitude arose, they appear to be at a loss."63 Zeller holds that this is only an inference of Aristotle's,64 and he is probably right in this sense, that the Pythagoreans never felt the need of saying in so many words that points had magnitude. It does seem probable, however, that they called them ὄγκοι.65

Zeller, moreover, allows, and indeed insists, that in the Pythagorean cosmology the numbers were spatial, but he raises difficulties about the other parts of the system. There are other things, such as the Soul and Justice and Opportunity, which are said to be numbers, and which cannot be regarded as constructed of points, lines, and surfaces.66 Now it appears to me that this is just the meaning of a passage in which Aristotle criticises the Pythagoreans. They held, he says, that in one part of the world Opinion prevailed, while a little above it or below it were to be found Injustice or Separation or Mixture, each of which was, according to them, a number. But in the very same regions of the heavens were to be found things having magnitude which were also numbers. How can this be, since justice has no magnitude?67 This means surely that the Pythagoreans had failed to give any clear account of the relation between these more or less fanciful analogies and their geometrical construction of the universe.



Burnet's Notes

.

63. Arist. Met. M, 6. 1080 b 18 sqq., 1083 b 8 sqq. ; De caelo, Γ, 1. 300 a 16 (R. P. 76 a).

64. Zeller, p. 381.

65. Zeno in his fourth argument about motion, which, we shall see (§ 163), was directed against the Pythagoreans, used ὄγκοι for points. Aetios, i. 3, 19 (R. P. 76 b), says that Ekphantos of Syracuse was the first of the Pythagoreans to say that their units were corporeal. Cf. also the use of

ὄγκοι in Plato, Parm. 164 d, and Galen, Hist. Phil. 18 (Dox. p. 610), Ἡρακλείδης δὲ ὁ Ποντικὸς καὶ Ἀσκληπιάδης ὁ βιθυνὸς ἀνάρμους ὄγκους τὰς ἀρχὰς ὑποτίθενται τῶν ὅλων.

66. Zeller, p. 381.

67. Arist. Met. A, 8.,990 a 22 (R. P. 81 e). I read and interpret thus "For, seeing that, according to them, Opinion and Opportunity are in a given part of the world, and a little above or below them Injustice and Separation and Mixture,—in proof of which they allege that each of these is a number,—and seeing that it is also the case (reading συμβαίνῃ with Bonitz) that there is already in that part of the world a number of composite magnitudes (i.e. composed of the Limit and the Unlimited), because those affections (of number) are attached to their respective regions (seeing that they hold these two things), the question arises whether the number which we are to understand each of these things (Opinion, etc.) to be is the same as the number in the world (i.e. the cosmological number) or a different one." I cannot doubt that these are the extended numbers which are composed (συνίσταται) of the elements of number, the limited and the unlimited, or, as Aristotle here says, the "affections of number," the odd and the even. Zeller's view that "celestial bodies" are meant comes near this, but the application is too narrow. Nor is it the number (πλῆθος) of those bodies that is in question, but their magnitude (μέγεθος). For other views of the passage see Zeller, p. 391, n. 1.






















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