From Chapter VIII., The Younger Eleatics
161. The Unit
That this argument refers to points is proved by an instructive passage from Aristotle's Metaphysics.33 We read there--
If the unit is indivisible, it will, according to the proposition of Zeno, be nothing. That which neither makes anything larger by its addition to it, nor smaller by its subtraction from it, is not, he says, a real thing at all; for clearly what is real must be a magnitude. And, if it is a magnitude, it is corporeal; for that is corporeal which is in every dimension. The other things, i.e. the plane and the line, if added in one way will make things larger, added in another they will produce no effect; but the point and the unit cannot make things larger in any way.
From all this it seems impossible to draw any other conclusion than that the "one" against which Zeno argued was the "one" of which a number constitute a "many," and that is just the Pythagorean unit.
32. See last note.
33. Arist. Met. B, 4. 1001 b 7.
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