Early Greek Philosophy by John Burnet, with Burnet's notes
64. His Book 66. The Doxographical Tradition

From Chapter III., Herakleitos of Ephesos

65. The Fragments
I give a version of the fragments according to the arrangement of Bywater's exemplary edition:13

(1) It is wise to hearken, not to me, but to my Word, and to confess that all things are one.14 R.P. 40.

(2) Though this Word15 is true evermore, yet men are as unable to understand it when they hear it for the first time as before they have heard it at all. For, though all things come to pass in accordance with this Word, men seem as if they had no experience of them, when they make trial of words and deeds such as I set forth, dividing each thing according to its kind and showing how it truly is. But other men know not what they are doing when awake, even as they forget what they do in sleep. R.P. 32.

(3) Fools when they do hear are like the deaf: of them does the saying bear witness that they are absent when present. R.P. 31 a.

(4) Eyes and ears are bad witnesses to men if they have souls that understand not their language. R.P. 42.

(5) The many do not take heed of such things as those they meet with, nor do they mark them when they are taught, though they think they do.

(6) Knowing not how to listen nor how to speak.

(7) If you do not expect the unexpected, you will not find it; for it is hard to be sought out and difficult.16

(8) Those who seek for gold dig up much earth and find a little. R.P. 44 b.

(10) Nature loves to hide. R.P. 34 f.

(11) The lord whose is the oracle at Delphoi neither utters nor hides his meaning, but shows it by a sign. R.P. 30. a.

(12) And the Sibyl, with raving lips uttering things mirthless, unbedizened, and unperfumed, reaches over a thousand years with her voice, thanks to the god in her. R.P. 30 a.

(13) The things that can be seen, heard, and learned are what I prize the most. R.P. 42.

(14) . . . bringing untrustworthy witnesses in support of disputed points.

(15) The eyes are more exact witnesses than the ears.17 R.P. 42 c.

(16) The learning of many things teacheth not understanding, else would it have taught Hesiod and Pythagoras, and again Xenophanes and Hekataios. R.P. 31.

(17) Pythagoras, son of Mnesarchos, practised scientific inquiry beyond all other men, and making a selection of these writings, claimed for his own wisdom what was but a knowledge of many things and an imposture.18 R.P. 31 a.

(18) Of all whose discourses I have heard, there is not one who attains to understanding that wisdom is apart from all. R.P. 32 b.

(19) Wisdom is one thing. It is to know the thought by which all things are steered through all things. R.P. 40.

(20) This world,19 which is the same for all, no one of gods or men has made; but it was ever, is now, and ever shall be an ever-living Fire, with measures of it kindling, and measures going out. R.P. 35.20

(21) The transformations of Fire are, first of all, sea; and half of the sea is earth, half whirlwind...21 R.P. 35 b.

(22) All things are an exchange for Fire, and Fire for all things, even as wares for gold and gold for wares. R.P. 35.

(23) It becomes liquid sea, and is measured by the same tale as before it became earth.22 R.P. 39.

(24) Fire is want and surfeit. R.P. 36 a.

(25) Fire lives the death of air,23 and air lives the death of fire; water lives the death of earth, earth that of water. R.P. 37.

(26) Fire in its advance will judge and convict24 all things. R.P. 36 a.

(27) How can one hide from that which never sets?

(28) It is the thunderbolt that steers the course of all things. R.P. 35 b.

(29) The sun will not overstep his measures; if he does, the Erinyes, the handmaids of Justice, will find him out. R.P. 39.

(30) The limit of dawn and evening is the Bear; and opposite the Bear is the boundary of bright Zeus.25

(31) If there were no sun it would be night, for all the other stars could do.26

(32) The sun is new every day.

(33) (Thales foretold an eclipse.)

(34) . . . the seasons that bring all things.

(35) Hesiod is most men's teacher. Men are sure he knew very many things, a man who did not know day or night! They are one.27 R.P. 39 b.

(36) God is day and night, winter and summer, war and peace, surfeit and hunger; but he takes various shapes, just as fire,28 when it is mingled with spices, is named according to the savour of each. R.P. 39 b.

(37) If all things were turned to smoke, the nostrils would distinguish them.

(38) Souls smell in Hades. R.P. 46 d.

(39) Cold things become warm, and what is warm cools; what is wet dries, and the parched is moistened.

(40) It scatters and it gathers; it advances and retires.

(41, 42) You cannot step twice into the same rivers; for fresh waters are ever flowing in upon you. R.P. 33.

(43) Homer was wrong in saying: "Would that strife might perish from among gods and men!" He did not see that he was praying for the destruction of the universe; for, if his prayer were heard, all things would pass away.29 . . . R.P. 34 d.

(44) War is the father of all and the king of all; and some he has made gods and some men, some bond and some free. R.P. 34.

(45) Men do not know how what is at variance agrees with itself. It is an attunement of opposite tensions,30 like that of the bow and the lyre. R.P. 34.E

(46) It is the opposite which is good for us.31

(47) The hidden attunement is better than the open. R.P. 34.

(48) Let us not conjecture at random about the greatest things.

(49) Men that love wisdom must be acquainted with very many things indeed.

(50) The straight and the crooked path of the fuller's comb is one and the same.

(51) Asses would rather have straw than gold. R.P. 37 a.

(51a)32 Oxen are happy when they find bitter vetches to eat. R.P. 48

(52) The sea is the purest and the impurest water. Fish can drink it, and it is good for them; to men it is undrinkable and destructive. R.P. 47 c.

(53) Swine wash in the mire, and barnyard fowls in dust.

(54) . . . to delight in the mire.

(55) Every beast is driven to pasture with blows.33

(56) Same as 45: Men do not know how what is at variance agrees with itself. It is an attunement of opposite tensions, like that of the bow and the lyre. R.P. 34.E

(57) Good and ill are one. R.P. 47 c.

(58) Physicians who cut, burn, stab, and rack the sick, demand a fee for it which they do not deserve to get. R.P. 47 c.34

(59) Couples are things whole and things not whole, what is drawn together and what is drawn asunder, the harmonious and the discordant. The one is made up of all things, and all things issue from the one.35

(60) Men would not have known the name of justice if these things were not.36

(61) To God all things are fair and good and right, but men hold some things wrong and some right. R.P. 45.

(62) We must know that war is common to all and strife is justice, and that all things come into being and pass away (?) through strife.

(64) All the things we see when awake are death, even as all we see in slumber are sleep. R.P. 42c.37

(65) The wise is one only. It is unwilling and willing to be called by the name of Zeus. R.P. 40.'

(66) The bow (βιός) is called life (βίος) but its work is death. R.P. 49 a.

(67) Mortals are immortals and immortals are mortals, the one living the others' death and dying the others' life. R.P. 46.

(68) For it is death to souls to become water, and death to water to become earth. But water comes from earth; and from water, soul. R.P. 38.

(69) The way up and the way down is one and the same. R.P. 36 d.

(70) In the circumference of a circle the beginning and end are common.

(71) You will not find the boundaries of soul by travelling in any direction, so deep is the measure of it.38 R.P. 41 d.

(72) It is pleasure to souls to become moist. R.P. 46 c.

(73) A man, when he gets drunk, is led by a beardless lad, tripping, knowing not where he steps, having his soul moist. R.P. 42.

(74-76) The dry soul is the wisest and best.39 R.P. 42.

(77) Man kindles a light for himself in the night-time, when he has died but is alive. The sleeper, whose vision has been put out, lights up from the dead; he that is awake lights up from the sleeping.40

(78) And it is the same thing in us that is quick and dead, awake and asleep, young and old; the former are shifted41 and become the latter, and the latter in turn are shifted and become the former. R.P. 47.

(79) Time is a child playing draughts, the kingly power is a child's. R.P. 40 a.

(80) I have sought for myself. R.P. 48.

(81) We step and do not step into the same rivers; we are and are not. R.P. 33 a.

(82) It is a weariness to labour for the same masters and be ruled by them.

(83) It rests by changing.

(84) Even the posset separates if it is not stirred.

(85) Corpses are more fit to be cast out than dung.

(86) When they are born, they wish to live and to meet with their dooms—or rather to rest—and they leave children behind them to meet with their dooms in turn.

(87-89) A man may be a grandfather in thirty years.

(90) Those who are asleep are fellow-workers (in what goes on in the world).

(91a) Thought is common to all.

(91b) Those who speak with understanding must hold fast to what is common to all as a city holds fast to its law, and even more strongly. For all human laws are fed by the one divine law. It prevails as much as it will, and suffices for all things with something to spare. R.P. 43.

(92) So we must follow the common,42 yet though my Word is common, the many live as if they had a wisdom of their own. R.P. 44.

(93) They are estranged from that with which they have most constant intercourse.43 R.P. 32 b.

(94) It is not meet to act and speak like men asleep.

(95) The waking have one common world, but the sleeping turn aside each into a world of his own.

(96) The way of man has no wisdom, but that of God has. R.P. 45.

(97) Man is called a baby by God, even as a child by a man. R.P. 45.

(98, 99) The wisest man is an ape compared to God, just as the most beautiful ape is ugly compared to man.

(100) The people must fight for its law as for its walls. R.P. 43 b.

(101) Greater deaths win greater portions. R.P. 49 a.

(102) Gods and men honour those who are slain in battle. R.P. 49 a.

(103) Wantonness needs putting out, even more than a house on fire. R.P. 49 a.

(104) It is not good for men to get all they wish to get. It is sickness that makes health pleasant; evil,44 good; hunger, plenty; weariness, rest. R.P. 48 b.

(105-107) It is hard to fight with one's heart's desire.45 Whatever it wishes to get, it purchases at the cost of soul. R.P. 49 a.

(108, 109) It is best to hide folly; but it is hard in times of relaxation, over our cups.

(110) And it is law, too, to obey the counsel of one. R.P. 49 a.

(111) For what thought or wisdom have they? They follow the poets and take the crowd as their teacher, knowing not that there are many bad and few good. For even the best of them choose one thing above all others, immortal glory among mortals, while most of them are glutted like beasts.46 R.P. 31 a.

(112) In Priene lived Bias, son of Teutamas, who is of more account than the rest. (He said, "Most men are bad.")

(113) One is ten thousand to me, if he be the best. R.P. 31 a.

(114) The Ephesians would do well to hang themselves, every grown man of them, and leave the city to beardless lads; for they have cast out Hermodoros, the best man among them, saying, "We will have none who is best among us; if there be any such, let him be so elsewhere and among others."47 R.P. 29 b.

(115) Dogs bark at every one they do not know. R.P. 31 a.

(116) . . . (The wise man) is not known because of men's want of belief.

(117) The fool is fluttered at every word. R.P. 44 b.

(118) The most esteemed of them knows but fancies,48 and holds fast to them, yet of a truth justice shall overtake the artificers of lies and the false witnesses.

(119) Homer should be turned out of the lists and whipped, and Archilochos likewise. R.P. 31.

(120) One day is like any other.

(121) Man's character is his fate.49

(122) There awaits men when they die such things as they look not for nor dream of. R.P. 46 d.

(123) . . . 50 that they rise up and become the wakeful guardians of the quick and dead. R.P. 46 d.

(124) Night-walkers, Magians, Bakchoi, Lenai, and the initiated . . .

(125) The mysteries practised among men are unholy mysteries. R.P. 48.

(126) And they pray to these images, as if one were to talk with a man's house, knowing not what gods or heroes are. R.P. 49 a.

(127) For if it were not to Dionysos that they made a procession and sang the shameful phallic hymn, they would be acting most shamelessly. But Hades is the same as Dionysos in whose honour they go mad and rave. R.P. 49.

(129, 130) They vainly purify themselves by defiling themselves with blood, just as if one who had stepped into the mud were to wash his feet in mud. Any man who marked him doing thus, would deem him mad. R.P. 49 a.

Burnet's Notes


13. In his edition, Diels has given up all attempt to arrange the fragments according to subject, and this makes his text unsuitable for our purpose. I think, too, that he overestimates the difficulty of an approximate arrangement, and makes too much of the view that the style of Herakleitos was "aphoristic." That it was so, is an important and valuable remark; but it does not follow that Herakleitos wrote like Nietzsche. For a Greek, however prophetic in his tone, there must always be a distinction between an aphoristic and an incoherent style.

14. Both Bywater and Diels accept Bergk's λόγου for δόγματος and Miller's εἶναι for εἰδεναι Cf. Philo, Leg. all. iii. c 3, quoted in Bywater's note.

15. The λόγος is primarily the discourse of Herakleitos himself; though, as he is a prophet, we may call it his "Word." It can neither mean a discourse addressed to Herakleitos nor yet "reason." (Cf. Zeller, p. 630, n. 1; Eng. trans. ii. p. 7, n. 2.) A difficulty has been raised about the words ἐόντος αἰεί. How could Herakleitos say that his discourse had always existed? The answer is that in Ionic ἐών means "true" when coupled with words like λόγος Cf. Herod. 1. 30, τῷ ἐόντι χρησάμενος λέγει; and even Aristoph. Frogs, 1052, οὐκ ὄντα λόγον. It is only by taking the words in this way that we can understand Aristotle's hesitation as to the proper punctuation (Rhet. Γ, 5. 1407 b 15; R.P. 30. a). The Stoic interpretation given by Marcus Aurelius, iv. 46 (R.P. 32 b), must be rejected. In any case, the Johannine doctrine of the λόγος has nothing to do with Herakleitos or with anything at all in Greek philosophy, but comes from the Hebrew Wisdom literature. See Rendel Harris, "The Origin of the Prologue to St. John's Gospel," in The Expositor, 1916, pp. 147 sqq.

16. I have departed from the punctuation of Bywater here, and supplied a fresh object to the verb as suggested by Gomperz (Arch. i. l00).

17. Cf. Herod. 1. 8.

18. The best attested reading is ἐποιήσατο not ἐποίησεν, and ἐποιήσατο ἑαυτοῦ means "claimed as his own." The words ἐκλεξάμενος ταύτας τὰς συγγρφάς have been doubted since the time of Schleiermacher, and Diels now regards the whole fragment as spurious. This is because it was used to prove that Pythagoras wrote books (cf. Diels, Arch. iii. p. 451). As Bywater pointed out, however, the fragment itself only says that he read books. I would further suggest that the old-fashioned συγγραφάς is too good for a forger, and that the omission of the very thing to be proved would be remarkable. The last suggestion of a book by Pythagoras disappears with the reading ἐποιήσατο for ἐποίησεν. For the rendering given for κακοτεχνίη, compare its legal sense of "falsified evidence."

19. The word κόσμος must mean "world" here, not merely "order"; for only the world could be identified with fire. This use of the word is Pythagorean, and Herakleitos may quite well have known it.

20. It is important to notice that μέτρα is internal accusative with ἁπτόμενον, " with its measures kindling and its measures going out." This interpretation, which I gave in the first edition, is now adopted by Diels (Vors.3 12 B 30 n.).

21. On the word πρηστήρ, see below, p. 149, n. 1.

22. The subject of fr. 23 is γῆ as we see from Diog. ix. 9 (R.P. 36), πάλιν τε αὖ τὴν γῆν χεῖσθαι; and Aet. i. 3, 11 (Dox. p. 284 a 1; b 5), ἔπειτα ἀναχαλωμένην τὴν γῆν ὑπὸ τοῦ πυρὸς χύσει (Dübner: φύσει, libri) ὕδωρ ἀποτελεῖσθαι. Herakleitos may have said γῆ θάλασσα διαχέεται, and Clement (Strom. v. p. 712) seems to imply this. The phrase μετρέεται εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν λόγον can only mean that the proportion of the measures remains constant. So Zeller (p. 690, n. 1), zu derselben Grösse. Diels (Vors. 12 B 31 n.) renders "nach demselben Wort (Gesetz)," but refers to Lucr. v. 257, which supports the other interpretation (pro parte sua).

23. It is doubtful whether this fragment is quoted textually. It seems to imply the four elements of Empedokles.

24. I understand ἐπελθόν of the πυρὸς ἔφοδος, for which see p. 151, n. 1. Diels has pointed out that καταλαμβάνειν is the old word for "to convict."

25. Here it is clear that οὖρος = τέρματα, and therefore means "boundary," not "hill." Strabo, who quotes the fragment (i. 6, p. 3), is probably right in taking ἠοῦς καὶ ἑσπέρας as equivalent to ἀνατολῆς καὶ δύσεως and making the words refer to the "arctic" circle. As αἴθριος Ζεύς means the bright blue sky, it is impossible for its οὖρος to be the South Pole, as Diels suggests. It is more likely the horizon. I take the fragment as a protest against the Pythagorean theory of a southern hemisphere.

26. We learn from Diog. ix. 10 (quoted below, p. 147) that Herakleitos explained why the sun was warmer and brighter than the moon, and this is doubtless a fragment of that passage.

27. Hesiod said Day was the child of Night (Theog. 124).

28. Reading ὅκωπερ πῦρ for ὅκωσπερ with Diels.

29. Il. xviii. 107. I add οἰχήσεσθαι γὰρ πάντα from Simpl. in Cat. 412, 26. It must represent something that was in the original.

30. I cannot believe Herakleitos said both παλίντονος and παλίντροπος ἁρμονίη, and I prefer Plutarch's παλίντονος (R.P. 34 b) to the παλίντροπος of Hippolytos. Diels thinks that the polemic of Parmenides favours παλίντροπος, but see below, p. 164, n. 1, and Chap. IV. p. 174, n. 3.

31. This refers to the medical rule αἱ δ' ἰατρεῖαι διὰ τῶν ἐναντίων, e.g. βοηθεῖν τῷ θερμῷ ἐπὶ τὸ ψυχρόν.

32. See Bywater in Journ. Phil. ix. p. 230.

33. On fr. 55 see Diels in Berl. Sitzb., 1901, p. 188.

34. I now read ἐπαιτέονται with Bernays and Diels.

35. On fr. 59 see Diels in Berl. Sitzb., 1901, p. 188. The reading συνάψιες seems to be well attested and gives an excellent sense. The alternative reading συλλάψιες is preferred by Hoffmann, Gr. Dial. iii. 240.

36. By "these things" he probably meant all kinds of injustice.

37. Diels supposes that fr. 64 went on ὁκόσα δὲ τεθνηκότες ζωή. "Life, Sleep, Death is the threefold ladder in psychology, as in physics Fire, Water, Earth."

38. The words οὕτω βαθὺν λόγον ἔχει present no difficulty if we remember that λόγος means "measurement," as in fr. 23.

39. This fragment is interesting because of the antiquity of the corruptions it has suffered. According to Stephanus, who is followed by Bywater, we should read: Αὔη ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ ἀρίστη, ξηρή being a mere gloss upon αὔη. When once ξηρή got into the text; αὔη became αὐγή, and we get the sentence, "the dry light is the wisest soul," whence the siccum lumen of Bacon. Now this reading is as old as Plutarch, who, in his Life of Romulus (c. 28), takes αὐγή to mean lightning, as it sometimes does, and supposes the idea to be that the wise soul bursts through the prison of the body like dry lightning (whatever that may be) through a cloud. (It should be added that Diels now holds that a αὐγή ξηρὴ ψυχὴ σοφωτάτη καὶ αρίστη is the genuine reading.) Lastly, though Plutarch must have written αὐγή, the MSS. vary between αὕτη and αὐτή (cf. De def. or. 432 f. αὕτη γὰρ ξηρὰ ψυχὴ in the MSS.). The next stage is the corruption of the αὐγή into οὗ γῆ. This yields the sentiment that "where the earth is dry, the soul is wisest," and is as old as Philo (see Bywater's notes).

40. I adopt the fuller text of Diels here. It is clear that Death, Sleep, Waking correspond to Earth, Water, Air in Herakleitos (cf. fr. 68). I think, however, that we must take ἅπτεται in the same sense all through the fragment, so I do not translate "is in contact with," as Diels does.

42. Sext. Math. vii. 133, διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῷ κοινῷ (so the MSS. ξυνῷ Schleiermacher). ξυνὸς γὰρ ὁ κοινός. Bywater omits the words, but I think they must belong to Herakleitos. Diels adopts Bekker's suggestion to read διὸ δεῖ ἕπεσθαι τῷ <ξυνῷ, τουτέστι τῷ> κοινῳ. I now think also that, if we understand the term λόγος in the sense explained above (p. 133, n. 1), there is no reason to doubt the words which follow.

43. The words λόγῳ τῳ τὰ ὅλα διοικοῦντι belong to Marcus Aurelius and not to Herakleitos.

44. Adopting Heitz's κακὸν for καὶ with Diels.

45. The word θυμός has its Homeric sense. The gratification of desire implies the exchange of dry soul-fire (fr. 74) for moisture (fr. 72). Aristotle misunderstood θυμός here as anger (Eth. Nic. B, 2. 1105 a 8).

46. This seems to refer to the "three lives," Chap. II. § 45, p. 98.

47. He went to Italy and took part in framing the Twelve Tables at Rome. See p. 131, n. 1.

48. Reading δοκέοντα with Schleiermacher (or δοκέοντ' ὦν with Diels). I also read γινώσκει, φυλάσσει with Diels, who quotes the combination φυλάσσουσι καὶ γινώσκουσι from Hippokrates.

49. On the meaning of δαίμων here, see my edition of Aristotle's Ethics, pp. 1 sq.

50. I have not ventured to include the words ἔνθα δ' ἐόντι at the beginning, as the text seems to me too uncertain. See, however, Diels's note.

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