0n Belief proceeding from our Invention, that part which consisteth in Proof, is already spoken of.
The other two parts follow; whereof one ariseth from the manners of the Speaker; the other from the passions of the Hearer.
The Principles, Colours, or Common Opinions upon which a mans belief is grounded concerning the manners of him that speaks, are to be had partly out of that which hath been said before concerning Vertue, book i. chap. 9, partly out of those things which shall be said by and by, concerning the Passions. For a man is believed either for his Prudence, or for his Probity, which are Vertues; or for Good Will: of which among the Passions.
The Principles concerning Belief, arising from the Passion of the Hearer, are to be gathered from that which shall now be said of the several Passions in order.
In every one of which three things are to be considered:
1. First, how men are affected.
2. Secondly, towards whom.
3. Thirdly, for what.
ANGER is desire of Revenge, joyned with grief for that he, or some of his, is, or seems to be neglected.
The object of Anger is always some particular, or individual thing.
In Anger there is also pleasure proceeding from the imagination of revenge to come.
To Neglect, is to esteem little or nothing: and of three kinds.
Contempt, is when a man thinks another of little worth in comparison to himself.
Crossing, is the hinderance of another mans will without design to profit himself.
Contumely, is the disgracing of another for his own pastime.
The common Opinions concerning Anger are therefore such as follow:
They are easily Angry that think they are neglected.
That think they excell others; as the Rich with the Poor; the Noble with the Obscure, etc.
And such as think they deserve well.
And such as grieve to be hindered, opposed, or not assisted. And therefore sick men, poor men, lovers, and generally all that desire and attain not, are angry with those that standing by, are not moved with their wants.
And such as having expected good, find evil.
Those that men are angry with, are,
Such as mock, deride, or jest at them.
And such as shew any kind of Contumely, towards them.
And such as despise those things which we spend most labour and study upon: and the more, by how much we seem the less advanced therein.
And our friends, rather than those that are not our friends.
And such as have honoured us, if they continue not.
And such as requite not our courtesie.
And such as follow contrary courses, if they be our inferiours.
And our friends, if they have said, or done us evil, or not good.
And such as give not eare to our intreaty.
And such as are joyful, or calm in our distress.
And such as troubling us, are not themselves troubled.
And such as willingly hear or see our disgraces.
And such as neglect us in the presence of our Competitors; of those we admire; of those we would have admire us; of those we reverence; and of those that reverence us.
And such as should help us, and neglect it.
And such as are in jest, when we are in earnest.
And such as forget us, or our Names.
An Orator therefore must so frame his Judge or Auditor by his Oration; as to make him apt to Anger: and then make his Adversary appear such as men use to be angry withal.
Of Reconciling, or Pacifying Anger.
RECONCILIATION is the appeasing of Anger.
Those to whom men are easily reconciled, are,
Such as have not offended out of neglect.
And such as have done it against their will.
And such as wish done the contrary of what they have done.
And such as have done as much to themselves.
And such as confess and repent.
And such as are humbled.
And such as do seriously the same things, that they do seriously.
And such as have done them more good heretofore, than now hurt.
And such as sue to them for any thing.
And such as are not insolent, nor mockers, nor slighters of others in their own disposition.
And generally such as are of a contrary disposition to those, whom men are usually angry withal.
And such as they fear or reverence.
And such as reverence them.
And such as have offended their Anger.
Such as are contrarily affected to those whom we have said before to be easily angry.
And such as play, laugh, make merry, prosper, live in plenty; and in sum, all that have no cause of grief.
And such as have given their anger time.
Men lay down their Anger for these Causes.
Because they have gotten the Victory.
Because the Offender has suffered more than they meant to inflict.
Because they have been revenged of another.
Because they think they suffer justly.
And because they think the revenge will not be felt, or not known that the revenge was theirs, and for such an injury.
And because the Offender is dead.
Whosoever therefore would asswage the anger of his Auditor, must make himself appear such, as men use to be reconciled unto: and beget in his Auditor such opinions, as make him reconcileable.
Of Love and Friends.
To Love, is to will well to another, and that for others, not for our own sake.
A Friend is he that loves, and he that is beloved.
Friends one to another, are they that naturally love one another.
A Friend therefore is he,
That rejoyceth at anothers Good.
And that grieves at his hurt.
And that wishes the same with us to a third, whether good, or hurt.
And that is Enemy or Friend to the same man.
We love them,
That have done good to us, or ours; especially if much, readily, or in season.
That are our Friends Friends.
That are our Enemies Enemies.
That are Liberal.
That are Valiant.
That are Just.
And that we would have love us.
And good Companions.
And such as can abide Jests.
And such as break Jests.
And such as praise us, especially for somewhat that we doubt of in our selves.
And such as are neat.
And such as upbraid us not with our vices, or with their own benefits.
And such as quickly forget injuries.
And such as least observe our Errors.
And such as are not of ill Tongue.
And those that are ignorant of our Vices.
And such as cross us not when we are busie, or angry.
And such as are officious towards us.
And those that are like us.
And such as follow the same course or trade of life, where they impeach not one another.
And such as labour for the same thing, when both may be satisfied.
And such as are not ashamed to tell us freely their faults, so it be not in contempt of us, and the faults such, as the World, rather than their own Consciences condemns.
And such as are ashamed to tell us of their very faults.
And such as we would have honour us, and not envie, but imitate us.
And such as we would do good to, except with greater hurt to our selves.
And such as continue their Friendship to the dead.
And such as speak their mind.
And such as are not terrible.
And such as we may rely on.
The several kinds of Friendship, are Society, Familiarity, Consanguinity, Affinity, etc.
The things that beget Love, are,
The bestowing of Benefits,--Gratis, Unasked or Privately.(1)
Of Enmity and Hatred.
THE Colours, or Common Opinions concerning Hatred are to be taken from the contrary of those, which concern Love and Friendship.
Hatred differs from Anger in this,
That Anger regards only what is done to ones self; but Hatred not.
And in this, that Anger regards particulars only; the other universals also.
And in this, that Anger is curable, Hatred not.
And in this, that Anger seeks the vexation, Hatred the damage of ones Adversary.
That with Anger there is always joined Grief; with Hatred not always.
That Anger may at length be satiated, but Hatred never.
Hence it appears how the Judge or Auditor may be made Friend or Enemy to us; and how our Adversary may be made appear Friend or Enemy to the Judge; and how we may answer to our Adversary, that would make us appear Enemies to him.
FEAR is a trouble, or vexation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of an evil at hand, which may hurt or destroy. Danger is the nearness of the evil feared.
The things to be feared, are,
Such as have power to hurt.
And the signs of will to do us hurt, as Anger and Hatred of powerful men
And Injustice joyned with Power.
And Valour provoked, joyned with Power.
And the fear of powerful men.
The men that are to be feared, are,
Such as know our Faults.
And such as can do us Injury.
And such as think they are injured by us.
And such as have done us Injury.
And our Competitors in such things as cannot satisfie both.
And such as are feared by more powerful men than we are.
And such as have destroyed greater men than we are.
And such as use to invade their inferiours.
And men not passionate, but dissemblers, and crafty, are more to be feared than those that are hasty and free.
The things especially to be feared, are,
Such, wherein if we err, the error cannot be repaired; at least, not according to ours, but our Adversaries pleasure.
And such as admit either none, or not easie help.
And such as being done, or about to be done to others, make us pity them.
They that fear not, are,
Such as expect not evil; or not now; or not this; or not from these.
And therefore men fear little in prosperity.
And men fear little that think they have suffered already.
An Orator therefore that would put Fear into the Auditor, must let him see that he is obnoxious; and that greater than he do suffer, and have suffered from those, and at those times they least thought.
ASSURANCE is hope, arising from an imagination that the help is near, or the evil afar off.
The things therefore that beget Assurance are,
The remoteness of those things that are to be feared, and the nearness of their contraries.
And the facility of great, or many helps or remedies.
And neither to have done, nor received Injury.
And to have no Competitors, or not great ones, or if great ones, at least friends; such as we have obliged, or are obliged to.
And that the danger is extended to more, or greater than us.
Assured, or Confident, are,
They that have oft escaped danger.
And they to whom most things have succeeded well.
And they that see their Equals, or inferiours not afraid.
And they that have wherewith to make themselves feared, as wealth, strength, etc.
And such as have done others no wrong.
And such as think themselves in good terms with God Almighty.
And such as think they will speed well that are gone before.
SHAME is a perturbation of the Mind arising from the apprehension of Evil, past, present, or to come, to the prejudice of a mans own, or his friends reputation.
The things therefore which men are ashamed of are those Actions which proceed from Vice, as,
To throw away ones Arms; to run away; signs of Cowardliness.
To deny that which is committed to ones trust, a sign of Injustice.
To have lyen with whom, where, and when we ought not, signs of Intemperance.
To make gain of small and base things; not to help with money whom and how much we ought; to receive help from meaner men; to ask money at use from such as one thinks will borrow of him; to borrow of him that expects payment of somewhat before lent; and to redemand what one has lent, of him that one thinks will borrow more; and so to praise, as one may be thought to ask; signs of Wretchedness.
To praise one to his face; to praise his vertues too much, and colour his vices; signs of Flattery.
To be unable to indure such labours as men indure that are elder, tenderer, greater in quality, and of less strength than he; signs of Effeminacy.
To be beholden often to another; and to upbraid those that are beholding to him; signs of Pusillanimity.
To speak and promise much of ones self more than is due; signs of Arrogance.
To want those things which ones Equals, all, or most of them have attained to, is also a thing to be ashamed of.
And to suffer things ignominious, as to serve about anothers person; or to be imployed in his base Actions.
In Actions of Intemperance, whether willingly, or unwillingly committed; there is shame in Actions of Force, only when they are done unwillingly.
The men before whom we are ashamed, are such as we respect; namely,
Those that admire us.
And those whom we desire should admire us.
And those whom we admire.
Those that contend with us for Honour.
Those whose opinion we contemn not.
And therefore men are most ashamed in the presence,
Of old and well bred men.
Of those we are always to live with.
Of those that are not guilty of the same fault.
Of those that do not easily pardon.
And of those that are apt to reveal our faults; such as are men injured, Backbiters, Scoffers, Comick Poets.
And of those before whom we have had always good success.
And of those who never asked any thing of us before.
And of such as desire our Friendship.
And of our familiars, that know none of our crimes.
And of such as will reveal our faults to any of those that are named before.
But in the presence of such whose judgment most men despise, men are not ashamed.
Therefore we are ashamed also in the presence,
Of those whom we reverence.
And of those who are concerned in our own, or Ancestors, or Kinsfolks actions or misfortunes, if they be shameful.
And of their Rivals.
And of those that are to live with them that know their disgrace.
The Common Opinions concerning Impudence are taken from the contrary of these.
Of Grace, or Favour.
GRACE is that Vertue, by which a man is said to do a good turn, or to do service to a man in need; not for his own but for his cause to whom he does it.
Great Grace is when the need is great; or when they are hard or difficult things that are conferred, or when the time is seasonable, or when he that confers the favour is the only, or the first man that did it.
Need, is a desire joyned with grief for the absence of the thing desired.
Grace therefore it is not, if it be not done to one that needs.
Whosoever therefore would prove that he has done a Grace, or Favour, must shew that he needeth it to whom it was done.
Grace it is not,
Which is done by Chance.
Nor which is done by Necessity.
Nor which has been Requited.
Nor that which is done to ones Enemy.
Nor that which is a Trifle.
Nor that which is Nought, if the Giver know the fault.
And in this manner a man may go over the Praedicaments, and examine a benefit, whether it be a Grace for being This, or for being so Much, or for being Such, or for being Now, etc.
Of Pity, or Compassion.
PITY is a perturbation of the mind, arising from the apprehension of hurt or trouble to another that doth not deserve it, and which he thinks may happen to himself, or his.
And because it appertains to Pity, to think that he, or his may fall into the misery he pities in others, it follows that they be most compassionate,
Who have passed through Misery.
And old Men.
And weak Men.
And timorous Men.
And learned Men.
And such as have Parents, Wife, and Children.
And such as think there be honest Men.
And that they are less compassionate,
Who are in great despair.
Who are in great prosperity.
And they that are angry; for they consider not.
And they that are very confident; for they also consider not.
And they that are in the Act of contumely; for neither do these consider.
And they that are astonished with fear.
And they that think no Man honest.
The things to be pitied are,
Such as grieve, and withal hurt.
Such as destroy.
And Calamities of fortune, if they be great; as none or few friends, deformity, weakness, lameness, etc.
And evil that arrives where good is expected.
And after extream evil, a little good.
And through a Mans life to have no good offer it self; or being offered, not to have been able to enjoy it.
Men to be pitied are,
Such as are known to us, unless they be so near to us, as their hurt be our own.
And such as be of our own years.
Such as are like us in manners.
Such as are of the same, or like stock.
And our equals in dignity.
Those that have lately suffered, or are shortly to suffer injury: and those that have the marks of injury past.
And those that have the words or actions of them in the present misery.
OPPOSITE in a manner to Pity in good Men, is Indignation, which is grief for the prosperity of a Man unworthy.
With Indignation there is always joyned a joy for the prosperity of a Man worthy, as Pity is always with contentment in the adversity of them that deserve it.
In wicked Men the opposite of Pity is,
Envy; as also the companions thereof delight in the harm of others, which the Greeks in one word have called epikairekakia. But of these in the next Chapter.
Men conceive Indignation against others, not for their vertues, as Justice, etc.
For these make Men worthy; and in Indignation we think Men unworthy.
But for those goods which men indued with vertue, and noble Men, and handsome Men are worthy of.
And for newly gotten power and riches, rather than for antient, and especially if by these he has gotten other goods, as by Riches, Command. The reason why we conceive greater Indignation against new than antient Riches, is, that the former seem to possess that which is none of theirs. But the antient seem to have but their own. For with common people, to have been so long, is to be so by Right.
And for the bestowing of goods incongruously: as when the arms of the most valiant Achilles were bestowed on the most eloquent Ulysses.
And for the comparison of the inferiour is the same thing, as when one valiant is compared with a more valiant; or whether absolutely superiour, as when a good Scholer is compared with a good Man.
Apt to Indignation are,
They that think themselves worthy of the greatest goods, and do possess them.
And they that are good.
And they that are ambitious.
And such as think themselves deserve better what another possesseth, than he that hath it.
Least apt to Indignation are,
Such as are of a poor, servile, and not ambitious Nature.
Who they are that Rejoyce, or Grieve not, at the adversity of him that suffers worthily, and in what occasions may be gathered from the contrary of what has been already said.
Whosoever therefore would turn away the Compassion of the Judge, he must make him apt to Indignation; and shew that his Adversary is unworthy of the Good, and worthy of the Evil which happens to him.
ENVY is grief, for the prosperity of such as our selves, arising not from any hurt that we, but from the good that they receive.
Such as our selves, I call those that are equal to us in blood, in age, in abilities, in glory, or in means.
They are apt to Envy,
That are within a little of the highest.
And those that are extraordinarily honoured for some quality that is singular in them, especially Wisdom or good Fortune.
And such as would be thought wise.
And such as catch at glory in every action.
And Men of poor spirits: for every thing appears great to them.
The things which Men Envy in others are,
Such as bring Glory.
And goods of Fortune.
And such things as we desire for our selves.
And things in the possession whereof we exceed others, or they us a little.
Obnoxious to Envy are,
Men of our own time, of our own Countrey, of our own age, and competitors of our Glory.
Those whom we strive with for honour.
And those that covet the same things that we do.
And those that get quickly, what we hardly obtain, or not at all.
And those that attain unto, or do the things that turn to our reproach, not being done by us.
And those that possess what we have possessed heretofore. So old and decayed Men envy the young and lusty.
And those that have bestowed little, are subject to be envyed by such as have bestowed much upon the same thing.
From the contraries of these may be derived the Principles concerning Joy for other Mens hurt.
He therefore that would not have his Enemy prevail, when he craves Pity, or other favour; must dispose the Judge to Envy; and make his Adversary appear such, as above described, to be subject to the Envy of others.
EMULATION is grief arising from that our Equals possess such goods as are had in honour, and whereof we are capable, but have them not; not because they have them, but because not we also.
No Man therefore Emulates another in things whereof himself is not capable.
Apt to Emulate are,
Such as esteem themselves worthy of more than they have.
And Young and Magnanimous Men.
And such as already possess the goods for which Men are honoured: for they measure their worth by their having.
And those that are esteemed worthy by others.
And those whose Ancestors, Kindred, Familiars, Nation, City, have been eminent for some good, do Emulate others for that good.
Objects of Emulation are, for things; Vertues.
And things whereby we may profit others.
And things whereby we may please others.
They that possess such things.
And such as many desire to be friends or acquainted with, or like unto.
And they whose praises flie abroad.
The contrary of Emulation is Contempt.
And they that Emulate such as have the goods aforementioned, Contemn such as have them not: and thence it is, that Men who live happily enough, unless they have the goods which Men honour, are nevertheless Contemned.
Of the Manners of Youth.
OF Passions we have already spoken.
We are next to speak of Manners.
Manners are distinguished by Passions, Habits, Ages, and Fortunes.
What kind of Manners proceed from Passions, and from Vertues and Vices (which are Habits), hath been already shewed.
There remains to be spoken of the Manners, that are peculiar to several Ages and Fortunes.
The Ages are Youth, Middle-Age, Old-Age.
And first of Youth.
Young Men are,
Violent in their desires.
Prompt to execute their desires.
Inconstant, easily forsaking what they desired before.
Longing mightily, and soon satisfied.
Apt to anger, and in their anger violent: and ready to execute their anger with their hands.
Lovers of Honour and of Victory more than Money, as having not been yet in Want.
Well natured, as having not been acquainted with much malice.
Full of hope, both because they have not yet been often frustrated, and because they have by natural heat that disposition that other Ages have by Wine; Youth being a kind of natural drunkenness. Besides, hope is of the time to come, whereof Youth hath much, but of the time past little.
Credulous, because not yet often deceived.
Easily deceived, because full of hope.
Valiant, because apt to Anger and full of hope; whereof this begets confidence, the other keeps off Fear.
Bashful, because they estimate the Honour of Action by the precepts of the Law.
Magnanimous, because not yet dejected by the misfortunes of human life.
And lovers of Honour more than Profit, because they live more by Custom than by Reason; and by Reason we acquire Profit, but Vertue by Custom.
Lovers of their Friends and Companions.
Apt to err in the excess, rather than the defect, contrary to that precept of Chilon, Ne quid nimis; for they overdo every thing: they Love too much, and Hate too much, because thinking themselves wise, they are obstinate in the opinion they have once delivered.
Doers of Injury rather for contumely than for Dammage.
Mercifull, because measuring others by their own innocence, they think them better than they be, and therefore less to merit what they suffer; which is a cause of Pity.
And lovers of Mirth, and by consequence such as love to jest at others.
Jesting is witty Contumely.
Of the Manners of Old Men.
THE Manners of Old Men are in a manner the contraries of those of Youth.
They determine nothing: they do every thing less vehemently than is fit: they never say they know; but to every thing they say, perhaps, and peradventure; which comes to pass from that having lived long, they have often mistaken and been deceived.
They are peevish because they interpret every thing to the worst.
And suspicious through Incredulity, and incredulous by reason of their Experience.
They love and hate, as if they means to continue in neither.
Are of poor spirits, as having been humbled by the chances of life.
And covetous, as knowing how easie 'tis to lose, and hard to get.
And timorous, as having been cooled by years.
And greedy of life: for good things seem greater by the want of them.
And lovers of themselves out of Pusillanimity.
And seek Profit more than Honour, because they love themselves; and Profit is among the goods that are not simply good, but good for ones self.
And without bashfulness, because they despise seeming.
And hope little; knowing by Experience that many times good Counsel has been followed with ill event, and because also they be timorous.
And live by Memory rather than Hope; for Memory is of the time past, whereof Old Men have good store.
And are full of Talk, because they delight in their Memory.
And Vehement in their anger: but not stout enough to execute it.
They have weak, or no desires; and thence seem Temperate.
They are slaves to Gain.
And live more by reason than Custom; because reason leads to Profit, as Custom to that which is Honourable.
And do Injury to indammage, and not in Contumely.
And are mercifull by Compassion, or imagination of the same evils in themselves, which is a kind of Infirmity, and not Humanity, as in Young Men, proceeding from a good opinion of those that suffer Evil.
And full of complaint, as thinking themselves not far from Evil, because of their Infirmity.
Seeing then that every Man loves such Men, and their discourses, which are most agreeable to their own Manners; 'tis not hard to collect, how the Orator, and his Oration may be made acceptable to the Hearer, whether Young or Old.
Of the Manners of Middle-aged Men.
THE Manners of Middle-aged Men, are between those of Youth, and Old Men, and therefore,
They neither dare, nor fear too much: but both as is fit.
They neither believe all; nor reject all; but judge.
They seek not only what is Honourable, nor only what is Profitable; but both.
They are neither Covetous, nor Prodigal; but in the mean.
They are neither easily Angry; nor yet Stupid: but between both.
They are Valiant, and withal Temperate.
And in general, whatsoever is divided in Youth, and Old Men, is compounded in Middle-age.
And whereof the Excess, or Defect is in Youth or Old Men; the Mediocrity is in those of the Middle-age.
Middle-age for the Body, I call the time from thirty to five and thirty years: for the Mind, the nine and fortieth, or thereabouts.
Of the Manners of the Nobility.
OF Manners that proceed from the several Ages we have already spoken.
We are next to speak of those that rise from several Fortunes.
The Manners of the Nobility are,
To be Ambitious.
To undervalue their Ancestors Equals. For the goods of Fortune seem the more precious for their Antiquity.
Nobility is the vertue of a Stock.
And Generosity, is not to degenerate from the vertue of his stock.
For as in Plants, so in the Races of Men, there is a certain progress; and they grow better and better to a certain point: and change, viz. Subtil wits into madness; and staid wits into stupidity and blockishness.
Of the Manners of the Rich.
RICH Men are Contumelious and Proud. This they have from their Riches. For seeing every thing may be had for Money, having Money, they think they have all that is good.
And Effeminate; because they have wherewithal to subminister to their Lust.
And Boasters of their Wealth: and speak in high terms foolishly. For Men willingly talk of what they love and admire; and think others affect the same that they do: and the truth is, all sorts of Men submit to the Rich.
And think themselves worthy to command, having that by which Men attain command.
And in general, they have the Manners of Fortunate Fools.
They do Injury, with intentions not to hurt, but to disgrace; and partly also through Incontinence.
There is a difference between New and Antient Riches: for they that are newly come to Wealth have the same faults in a greater degree: for New Riches are a kind of rudeness and apprentiship of Riches.
Of the Manners of Men in Power, and of such as prosper.
THE Manners of Men in Power, are the same, or better than those of the Rich.
They have a greater sense of Honour than the Rich; and their Manners are more Manly.
They are more Industrious than the Rich: for Power is sustained by Industry.
They are Grave, but without Austereness: for being in place conspicuous, they carry themselves the more modestly; and have a kind of gentle and comely Gravity, which the Greeks call semnotês.
When they do Injuries, they do great ones.
The Manners of Men that prosper, are compounded of the Manners of the Nobility, the Rich and those that are in Power, for to some of these all Prosperity appertains.
Prosperity in Children, and goods of the Body, make Men desire to exceed others in the goods of Fortune.
Men that Prosper have this ill, to be more proud and inconsiderate than others.
And this good; that they worship God, trusting in him, for that they find themselves to receive more good than proceeds from their Industry.
The Manners of Poor Men, Obscure Men, Men without Power, and Men in Adversity, may be collected from the Contrary of what has been said.
Common Places or Principles concerning what May be Done, what Has been Done, and what Shall be Done; or of Fact Possible, Past, and Future. Also of Great and Little.
WE have hitherto set down such Principles as are peculiar to several kinds of Orations.
Now we are to speak of such Places as are Common to them all; as these, Possible, Done, or Past, Future, Great, Small.
Possible is that,
The Contrary whereof is Possible.
And the like whereof is Possible.
And than which some harder thing is Possible.
And the beginning whereof is Possible.
And the end whereof is Possible.
And the usual consequent whereof is Possible.
And whatsoever we desire.
And the beginning whereof is in the power of those whom we can either compell or perswade.
And part whereof is Possible.
And part of the whole that is Possible.
And the General if a Particular.
And a Particular if the General.
And of Relatives, if one, the other.
And that which without Art and Industry is Possible, is much more so with Art and Industry.
And that which is Possible to worse, weaker, and unskilfuller Men, is much more so to better, stronger, and more skilful.
The Principles concerning Impossible are the Contraries of these.
That Has been done,
Than which a harder thing has been done.
And the consequent whereof has been done.
And that which being Possible, he had a will to, and nothing hindered.
And that which was Possible to him in his Anger.
And that which he longed to do.
And that which was before upon the point of doing.
And whose antecedent has been done; or that, for which it uses to be done.
And if that, for whose cause we do this, then this.
The Principles concerning Not done are the Contraries of these.
That Shall be done,
Which some Man can, and means to do.
And which some Man can, and desires to do.
And which is in the way, and upon the point to be done.
And the antecedents whereof are past.
And the Motive whereof is past.
Of Great and Small, More and Less, see chap. vii. book 1.
Of Example, Similitude, and Fables.
OF the Principles both general and special from whence Proofs are to be drawn, has been already spoken.
Now follow the Proofs themselves which are Examples or Enthymemes.
An Example is either an Example properly so called (as some Action past): or a Similitude (which is called a Parable): or a Fable (which contains some Action feigned).
An Example properly so called, is this; Darius came not into Greece, till he had first subdued Aegypt. Xerxes also conquered Aegypt first; then afterwards crossed the Hellespont. We ought therefore to hinder the King of Persia from conquering Aegypt.
A Similitude, or Parable, is such as followeth: They who choose their Magistrates by Lot, are like them that choose for their Champions those on whom the Lot shall fall, rather than those who have the greatest strength; and for their Pilot, not him that hath skill; but him whose name is drawn out of the Urne.
A Fable is in this manner. The Horse desiring to drive out the Stag from his common pasture, took a Man to assist him, and having received into his mouth a Bridle, and a Rider upon his Back, obtained his intent, but became subject to the Man. So you of Himera, having (in hope to be revenged of your Enemies) given unto Phalaris Soveraign Authority, that is to say, taken a Bridle into your Mouths; if you shall also give him a Guard to his Person, that is, let him get up upon your Backs, you become his slaves presently past recovery.
To find out Examples, that is, Actions done that may serve our purpose, is therefore hard, because not in our power.
But to find Fables and Similitudes, is easier; because by conversing in Philosophy, a Man may feign somewhat in nature like to the case in hand.
Examples, Similitudes, and Fables, where Enthymemes are wanting, may serve us in the beginning of an Oration for Inductions; otherwise are to be alledged after Enthymemes for Testimonies.
Of a Sentence.
A SENTENCE is an universal Proposition concerning those things which are to be desired or avoided, in the Actions or Passions of the common life. As,
A wise Man will not suffer his Children to be over-learned.
And is to an Enthymeme in Rhetorick, as any Proposition is to a Syllogisme in Logick.
And therefore a Sentence, if the reason be rendered, becomes a Conclusion, and both together make an Enthymeme.
As for Example,
To be over-learned, besides that it begets effeminacy, procures envy. Therefore he that's wise will not suffer his Children to be over-learned.
Of Sentences there be four sorts.
For they either require Proofs, or not: that is, are manifest, or not.
Such as are manifest, are either so, as soon as they are uttered; as,
Health is a great good.
Or as soon as they are considered; as,
Men used to hate whom they have hurt.
Such as are not manifest, are either Conclusions of Enthymemes; as,
He that's wise will not suffer his Children, etc.
Or else are Enthymematical; that is, have in themselves the force of an Enthymeme; as,
Mortal Men ought not to carry Immortal Anger.
A Sentence not Manifest, ought to be either Inferred or Confirmed.
'Tis not good to be effeminately minded, nor to be envyed by ones fellow Citizens. A wise Man therefore will not have his Children over-learned.
A wise Man will not have his Children over-learned, seeing too much Learning both softens a Mans mind, and procures him envy among his fellow Citizens.
If a reason be added to a manifest Sentence let it be short.
Sentences become not every Man; but only old Men, and such as be well versed in business. For to hear a young Man speak Sentences, is ridiculous; and to hear an ignorant Man speak Sentences, is absurd.
Sentences generally received, when they are for our purpose, ought not to be neglected, because they pass for truths. And yet they may be denyed, when any laudable custom, or humour may thereby be made appear in the Denyer.
The commodities of Sentences, are two.
One proceeding from the Vanity of the Hearer, who takes for true universally affirmed, that which he has found for true only in some particular; and therefore a Man ought to consider in every thing what opinion the Hearer holds.
Another is, that Sentences do discover the manners and disposition of the speaker; so that if they be esteemed good Sentences, he shall be esteemed a good Man; and if evil, an evil Man.
Thus much of Sentences, what they be; of how many sorts; how to be used; whom they become; and what is their profit.
Of the Invention of Enthymemes.
SEEING an Enthymeme differs from a Logical Syllogisme, in that it neither concludes out of every thing, nor out of remote Principles; the Places of it, from whence a Man may argue, ought to be certain, and determinate.
And because whosoever makes a Syllogisme Rhetorical, or other, should know all, or the most part of that which is in question; as, whosoever is to advise the Athenians in the question, whether they are to make War or no, must know what their Revenues be; what, and what kind of power they have: and he that will praise them, must know their acts at Salamis, Marathon, etc. It will be necessary for a good speaker to have in readiness the choicest particulars of whatsoever he foresees he may speak of.
He that is to speak ex tempore, must comprehend in his speech as much as he can of what is most proper in the matter in hand.
Proper, I call those things which are least common to others; as, he that will praise Achilles, is not to declare such things as are common both to him, and Diomedes; as that he was a Prince, and warred against the Trojans; but such things as are proper only to Achilles; as that he killed Hector and Cygnus; went to the War young, and voluntary.
Let this therefore be one general Place, from that which is
Of the Places of Enthymemes Ostensive.
FORASMUCH as Enthymemes either infer truly, or seem only so to do; and they which do infer indeed, be either Ostensive; or such as bring a man to some impossibility; we will first set down the Places of Enthymemes Ostensive.
An Ostensive Enthymeme is, wherein a man concludes the question from somewhat granted.
That Enthymeme which brings a Man to an impossibility, is an Enthymeme wherein from that which the Adversary maintaineth, we conclude that which is manifestly impossible.
All Places have been already set down in a manner in the precedent Propositions of Good, Evil, Just, Unjust, Honourable, and Dishonourable: namely, they have been set down as applyed to Particular Subjects, or in Concrete.
Here they are to be set down in another manner; namely in the Abstract or Universal.
The first Place then let be from Contraries, which in the Concrete or Particulars is exemplified thus. If Intemperance be hurtful, Temperance is profitable: and if Intemperance be not hurtful, neither is Temperance profitable.
Another Place may be from Cognomination or affinity of words: as in this Particular. If what is Just be Good; then what is justly is well: but justly to die is not well: therefore not all that is Just is Good.
A third from Relatives; as, This Man has justly done, therefore the other has justly suffered. But this Place sometimes deceives, for a man may suffer justly, yet not from him.
A fourth from Comparison, three ways.
From the Great to the Less: as, He has stricken his Father; and therefore this Man.
From the Less to the Greater: as, The Gods know not all things; much less Man.
From Equality: as, If Captains be not always the worse esteemed for losing a Victory; why should Sophisters?
Another from the Time: as Philip to the Thebans: If I had required to pass through your Country with my Army, before I had ayded you against the Phocaeans, there is no doubt but you would have promised it me. It is absurd therefore to deny it me now, after I have trusted you.
A sixth from what the Adversary says of himsef: as, Iphicrates asked Aristophon, whether he would take a Bribe to betray the Army; and he answering no; What (say he) is it likely that Iphicrates would betray the Army; and Aristophon not?
This Place would be ridiculous, where the Defendant were not in much more estimation than the Accuser.
A seventh from the Definition, as that of Socrates, a Spirit is either God, or the Creature of God: and therefore he denies not that there is a God, that confesses there are Spirits.
An eighth from the distinction of an ambiguous word.
A ninth from Division: as, If all Men do what they do for one of three causes, whereof two are impossible, and the Accuser charge not the Defendant with the third; it follows that he has not done it.
A tenth from Induction: as, At Athens, at Thebes, at Sparta, etc. And therefore every where.
An eleventh from Authority, or precedent sentence; as that of Sappho, that Death is evil, for that the Gods have judged it so, in exempting themselves from mortality.
A twelfth from the Consequence: as, 'Tis not good to be envied; therefore neither to be learned. 'Tis good to be wise, therefore also to be instructed.
A thirteenth from two contrary Consequences; as, 'Tis not good to be an Orator, because if he speak the truth, he shall displease Men: If he speak falsely, he shall displease God.
Here is to be noted, that sometimes this argument may be retorted: as thus, If you speak truth, you shall please God; if you speak untruth, you shall please men: therefore by all means be an Orator.
A Fourteenth from the quality that Men have to praise one thing, and approve another: as, We ought not to war against the Athenians upon no precedent injury; for all Men discommend injustice. Again, We ought to war against the Athenians; for otherwise our liberty is at their mercy, that is, is noLiberty; but the preservation of Liberty is a thing that all Men will approve.
A Fifteenth from Proportion: as, seeing we naturalize strangers for their vertues, why should we not banish this stranger for his vices?
A Sixteenth from the similitude of Consequents: as, He that denies the immortality of the Gods, is no worse than he that has written the generation of the Gods. For the same Consequence follows of both, that sometimes there are none.
A Seventeenth from that, that Men change their mind: as, If when we were in Banishment, we fought to recover our Country, why should we not fight now to retain it?
An Eighteenth from a fained end: as, that Diomedes chose Ulysses to go with him, not as more valiant than another; but as one that would partake less of the Glory.
A Nineteenth from the Cause; as if he would infer he did it from this, that he had Cause to do it.
A Twentieth from that which is Incredible, but True: as, that Laws may need a Law to mend them; as well as Fish bred in the salt Water, may need salting.
Of the Places of Enthymemes that lead to Impossibility.
LET the first Place be from inspection of Times, Actions, or Words, either of the Adversary, or of the Speaker, or both. Of the Adversary; as, He says, he loves the People, and yet he was in the Conspiracy of the Thirty. Of the Speaker; as, He says, I am contentious, and yet I never began Suit. Of both; as, He never conferred any thing to the benefit of the Commonwealth, whereas I have ransomed divers Citizens with mine own Money.
A Second, from shewing the cause of that which seemed amiss, and serves for Men of good reputation that are accused; as, The Mother that was accused of Incest for being seen embracing her Son, was absolved as soon as she made appear, that she embraced him upon his arrival from far, by way of Salutation.
A Third, from rendring of the cause; as, Leodamas, to whom it was objected, that he had, under the Thirty Tyrants, defaced the Inscription (which the People had set up in a Pillar) of his Ignominy; answered, He had not done it; because it would have been more to his commodity to let it stand; thereby to indear himself to the Tyrants, by the Testimony of the Peoples hatred.
A Fourth, from better Counsel, as, He might have done better for himself; therefore he did not this. But this Place deceives, when the better Counsel comes to mind after the Fact.
A Fifth, from Incompatibility of the things to be done, as They that did deliberate whether they should both mourn and sacrifice at the Funeral of Leucothea, were told, that if they thought her a Goddess, they ought not to Mourn, and if they thought her a Mortal, they ought not to Sacrifice.
A Sixth, (which is proper to Judicial Orations,) from an Inference of Errour; as, If he did it not, he was not wise, therefore he did it.(2)
Enthymemes that lead to Impossibility, please more than Ostensive: for they compare, and put contraries together, whereby they are the better set off, and more conspicuous to the Auditor.
Of all Enthymemes, they be best, which we assent to as soon as hear. For such consent pleaseth us; and makes us favourable to the Speaker.
Of the Places of seeming Enthymemes.
OF seeming Enthymemes, one Place may be from the Form of speaking; as when a Man has repeated divers Sentences, he brings in his Conclusion, as if it followed necessarily, though it do not.
A Second from an ambiguous word.
A Third from that which is true divided, to that which is false joyned; as that of Orestes, It was justice that I should revenge my Fathers death, and it was justice my Mother should die for killing my Father, therefore I justly killed my Mother. Or from that which is true joyned, to that which is false divided; as, one cup of Wine, and one cup of Wine, are hurtful; therefore one cup of Wine is hurtful.
A Fourth from Amplification of the Crime. For neither is the Defendant likely to have committed the Crime he amplifies; nor does the Accuser seem, when he is passionate, to want ground for his Accusation.
A Fifth from signs; as, when a Man concludes the doing of the Fact from the manner of his life.
A Sixth from that which comes by chance, as if from this, that the Tyranny of Hipparchus came to be overthrown from the love of Aristogeiton to Harmodius, a Man should conclude, that in a free Common-wealth loving of Boys were profitable.
A Seventh from the Consequence, as Banishment is to be desired, because a banished Man has choice of places to dwell in.
An Eighth from making that the cause which is not; as, In Demosthenes his Government, the War began; therefore Demosthenes governed well. With the Pelponnesian War began the Plague, therefore Pericles that perswaded that War, did ill.
A Ninth from the Omission of some circumstance, as, Helen did what was lawful, when she ran away with Paris, because she had her Father's consent to choose her own Husband; which was true only during the time that she had not chosen.
A Tenth, from that which is probable in some case, to that which is probable simply; as, 'Tis probable, he foresaw, that if he did it, he should be suspected; therefore 'tis probable he did it not.
From this Place one may infer both ways that he did it not. For if he be not likely to do it, it may be thought he did it not, again, if he were likely to do it, it may be thought he did it not, for this, that he knew he should be suspected.
Upon this Place was grounded the Art, which was so much detested in Protagoras, of making the better cause seem the worse; and the worse the better.
Of the Wayes to answer the Arguments of the Adversary.
An Argument is answered by an opposite Syllogisme, or by an Objection.
The Places of opposite Syllogismes are the same with the Places of Syllogismes, or Enthymemes: for a Rhetorical Syllogisme is an Enthymeme.
The Places of Objections are four.
First, from the same, as, To the Adversary that proves love to be good by an Enthymeme, may be objected, that no want is good, and yet Love is want; or particularly thus: The Love of Myrrha to her Father was not good.
The Second from Contraries: as, if the Adversary say, A good Man does good to his friends, an Objection might be made, that then an evil Man will do also evil to his friends.
The Third from Similitude: as thus, if the Adversary say, all Men that are injured, do hate those that have injured them, it may be objected, that then, all Men that had received Benefits should love their Benefactors, that is to say, be grateful.
The Fourth from the authority of famous men; as when a Man shall say, that drunken Men ought to be pardoned those Acts they do in their drunkenness, because they know not what they do; the Objection may be, that Pittacus was of another mind, that appointed for such Acts a double punishment; one for the Act, another for the Drunkenness.
And forasmuch as all Enthymemes are drawn from Probability, or Example, or from a Sign Fallible, or from a Sign infallible: an Enthymeme from Probability may be confuted really, by shewing that for the most part it falls out otherwise; but apparently or sophistically, by shewing only that it does not fall out so alwayes; whereupon the Judge thinks the Probability not sufficient to ground his Sentence upon.
[The Reason whereof is this, That the Judge, while he hears the Fact proved probable, conceives it as true. For the Understanding has no Object but Truth. And therefore by and by, when he shall hear an Instance to the contrary, and thereby find that he had no necessity to think it true, presently changes his opinion, and thinks it false, and consequently not so much as probable. For he cannot at one time think the same thing both probable and false: and he that says a thing is probable, the meaning is, he thinks it true, but finds not arguments enough to prove it.]
An Enthymeme from a fallible sign, is answered, by shewing the sign to be fallible.
An Enthymeme from an Example, is answered, as an Enthymeme from Probability; really, by shewing more Examples to the contrary; apparently, if he bring Examples enough to make it seem not necessary.
If the Adversary have more Examples than we, we must make appear that they are not applycable to the Case.
An Enthymeme from an infallible sign, if the Proposition be true, is unanswerable.
Amplification and Extenuation are not Common Places. Enthymemes by which arguments are answered, are the same with those by which the Matter in question is proved, or disproved. Objections are not Enthymemes.
THE first, that Amplification and Extenuation are not Common Places, appears by this, that Amplification and Extenuation do prove a fact to be great, or little; and are therefore Enthymemes, to be drawn from Common Places, and therefore are not the Places themselves.
The second, that Enthymemes, by which Arguments are answered, are of the same kind with those by which the matter in question is proved, is manifest by this, that these infer the opposite of what was proved by the other.
The third, that an Objection is no Enthymeme, is apparent by this, that an Objection is no more but an Opinion, Example, or other Instance, produced to make appear, that the Adversaries Argument does not conclude.
Thus much of Examples, Sentences, Enthymemes, and generally of all things that belong to Argumentation; from what Places they may be drawn, or answered.
There remains Elocution and Disposition to be spoken of in the next Book.
1. Web note: the formatting of this HTML line is different than the original text.
2. Aristotle mentions a seventh element, derivable from puns upon words. This however our analyst entirely overlook, from the consideration probably that it could contribute but little to the argumentative strength of an oration; or because it may be applied no less to confirmation than to refutation.
Scanned from: Aristotle; Treatise on Rhetoric, literally translated from the Greek, with the Analysis by T Hobbes, by Thomas Buckley, in the Bohn's Classical Library. Scanned by Agathon for Peithô's Web and your enjoyment.